



TRANSPORT SECURITY DIRECTORATE
(TRANSEC)



ANNUAL REPORT
TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR TRANSPORT
APRIL 2007 - MARCH 2008

CONTENTS PAGE

INTRODUCTION	
The role of Transport Security & Contingencies Directorate	4
Statutory basis	4
Requirement to report	4
Scope of this report	4
Preface from Director, Transec	5
SECURITY PROGRAMMES BY TYPE OF TRANSPORT	
Aviation security	
Landside security	6
Cabin baggage.....	6
Policing at airports.....	7
Heathrow Terminal 5.....	7
Air cargo security	7
Contingency response	8
National Aviation Security Committee	8
Training	8
Compliance	9
International work.....	9
Maritime security	
2005 Protocols to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts.....	10
Port security	10
Multi-agency threat and risk assessment (MATRA)	10
Vehicle access to maritime ports (VAMPS)	10
Training	10
Compliance	11
International work.....	11
Channel Tunnel security	
Joint government document.....	11
Review of requirements	11
Compliance	11
High Speed 1	11
Land transport security	
Domestic rail and underground security	12
Vehicle Access to Stations (VATS).....	12
Training	12
Compliance	12
Buses and coaches.....	13
Dangerous goods security	13
International work.....	13

SECURITY ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE TRANSPORT SECTOR	
Security reviews	13
Government counter-terrorist programme	14
Transport Select Committee inquiry: "Travelling Without Fear"	14
Transport security for the Olympics.....	14
Working with the industry	14
Threats, intelligence and contingencies	14
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT	
Research, analysis and development	15
National security vetting	15
Contingency planning.....	15
Secure communications.....	16
MANAGEMENT OF THE DIRECTORATE.....	
Business planning and resources	16
Flexible deployment	17
TRANSEC Information Management System (TIMS)	17
TRANSEC expenditure 2007-08	17 - 18
ANNEX A – Allocation of staff resources 2007-08	19 - 20
ANNEX B – Main abbreviations used in this report.....	21

INTRODUCTION

The role of Transport Security & Contingencies Directorate (TRANSEC)

The Department for Transport plays a key role within the Government's counter-terrorism strategy, led by its Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate (TRANSEC). TRANSEC is also involved in contingency planning in response to a range of major events, both terrorist and non-terrorist in nature.

TRANSEC aims to protect the travelling public, transport facilities and those working in transport from terrorist acts, and to retain public confidence in transport security. Elevated levels of threat continue to apply to a significant proportion of the UK transport network. The events of July 2005 and August 2006 demonstrated the terrorists' intent to target transport networks, with last summer's central London car bomb plot and the attack on Glasgow Airport underlining that threat levels have shown no sign of declining. For this reason, TRANSEC keeps all transport security measures, including those planned for the 2012 London Olympics, under constant review in the light of the developing threat.

Statutory basis

The legal basis for TRANSEC's role is set out in the Aviation Security Act 1982, the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (AMSA), the Channel Tunnel (Security Order) 1994 and the relevant sections of the Railways Act 1993. There is also EU regulation in respect of aviation and maritime security.

The powers in the legislation are given to the Secretary of State for Transport. She delegates that authority to junior Ministers, and to the Director of TRANSEC and her staff who exercise the powers on a day-to-day basis. Formal authorisation is given to the Director and certain senior TRANSEC staff to sign Directions obliging the industries to carry out the Government's requirements.

Requirement to report

During the passage through Parliament of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990, Ministers gave an undertaking that an annual report would be produced on the development and implementation of the National Aviation Security Programme (NASP). A similar undertaking was given for maritime security. Channel Tunnel and railways' security have also been covered in previous reports.

Scope of this report

The report presents, for each transport mode's security programme, the key activities and achievements for 2007-08. The report also contains some information about the management of the Directorate, and its work within Government; the international framework; and with industry.

Preface from Director, TRANSEC

The country remained at a “severe” threat level throughout the reporting year, meaning that a terrorist attack was highly likely. The attempted attacks in London and Glasgow at the end of June 2007 demonstrated the accuracy of this assessment. TRANSEC also had to respond to a number of natural hazards (e.g. flooding) which affected the transport networks.

In addition to these immediate operational challenges, TRANSEC dealt with a number of policy challenges during the reporting period, working with industry and other stakeholders to improve the design and delivery of security and, where possible, to ease the impact on passengers. These are described in more detail in the report. TRANSEC continued to be active overseas, working with regulators in international organisations and with individual states, particularly those where UK citizens regularly travel.

Our working assumption is that, for the foreseeable future, terrorists will continue to plan attacks against both “closed” and “open” networks, and that many UK transport operations overseas will present vulnerabilities that must be addressed. Our priority for the year 2008/09 will be to draw up a longer term strategy for transport security and to identify the key steps needed to implement that strategy over the next 5-10 years.

NIKI TOMPKINSON
Director TRANSEC

SECURITY PROGRAMMES BY TYPE OF TRANSPORT

The security programmes for each type of transport are kept under continuous review. Each programme of compliance activity is based on giving priority to areas of highest risk. What follows are the highlights of the reporting year by sector.

AVIATION SECURITY

The year continued to be dominated by the impact of the response to the alleged terrorist plot of August 2006 and the need to maintain heightened security measures for UK aviation.

Landside security

The attempted vehicle bomb attack at Glasgow airport on 30 June 2007 demonstrated not only the attractiveness of aviation as a target, but also the vulnerability of the landside areas. Measures had already been put in place at Glasgow which hindered this attempt. Following that incident, all UK airport operators were advised to take steps appropriate to their local circumstances to deter and hinder hostile access, so as to prevent a similar incident at their own airport. UK experts are providing on-site landside security surveys at airports and new guidance has been issued for airports on the security of landside areas.

Cabin baggage

An aviation security summit was hosted by the Secretary of State in July 2007. This provided an opportunity for Ministers and senior representatives from the aviation industry to discuss the operation of the current security regime; in particular, the impact of measures imposed to counteract the threat of liquid explosives. The importance of improving the integration of security into operations was also examined. It was agreed that the Government and industry would work together to consider how the one cabin bag restriction introduced after August 2006 could be lifted without compromising security.

Following on from the summit, a working group comprising representatives from airports and the airlines, and their respective trade associations, and from various parts of TRANSEC sought a way forward. As a result of this work, the Secretary of State was able to announce in November 2007 that the restriction on the number of cabin bags that air passengers could carry was to be lifted from 7 January 2008 at airports that are able to demonstrate they can maintain appropriate security levels.

This took place as and when airports were able to demonstrate that the necessary screening capacity was in place to be able to handle the additional cabin bags, whether by the use of new technology and procedures, or by deploying extra staff or other resources. A model was developed to enable an assessment to be made of the likely ability of an airport to cope with the additional throughput of bags against a range of scenarios. By the end of May it is expected that most airports will have been granted alleviation from the one bag restriction and that the number of cabin bags which may be carried will revert to being a matter of operational and commercial policy for individual airlines, working in conjunction

with the airports. The maximum size of cabin bag which may be carried remains unaltered, as do the restrictions on liquids. Work continues to identify possible technology options which might allow greater quantities of liquids to be carried, and for liquids to be carried in cabin baggage, rather than having to be presented for separate security screening.

The maximum size for items of **hand luggage** is 56cm x 45cm x 25cm per bag.

Some liquids are allowed through airport security check points. There are, however, restrictions on the quantity of liquids that can be taken through. Liquids, gels and aerosols are only allowed in individual containers of 100ml. All containers must fit comfortably in one, transparent, re-sealable bag no larger than 20cm x 20cm (e.g. a freezer bag). Please see the Department's website at <http://www.dft.gov.uk/transportforyou/airtravel/airportsecurity/requirements> for more details, exemptions, etc.

Policing at airports

The large programme of work by the joint DfT/Home Office project team to build on the recommendations of the Independent Review of Policing at Airports has continued, overseen by the Airport Policing Programme Board, which consists of senior members from the police, industry and government.

The aim is to strengthen further the overall security regime at airports, particularly the co-operation and co-ordination between security stakeholders. One key output is to ensure that any policing requirements are determined at each airport by a clear and transparent process and included as part of the total package of security measures in an Airport Security Plan agreed by all agencies. This should then be the basis to agree the amount airport operators will pay for such policing. The key elements of the new process have now been agreed by the Programme Board and approval has been received for a Transport Security Bill for the 08/09 parliamentary session to place the new regime on the appropriate footing. Accompanying guidance is being developed to help stakeholders implement this process.

Heathrow Terminal 5

TRANSEC worked closely with BAA plc on all aspects of the Terminal 5 security regime since the early stages of the project to ensure compliance with the requirements of the National Aviation Security Programme. The terminal was officially opened by Her Majesty the Queen on 14 March 2008, and operations started from 27 March. Despite the well-publicised problems with baggage handling, the security screening operation has been functioning efficiently and effectively.

Air cargo security

The UK's air cargo security regime now comprises over 400 regulated agents at 850 sites and 1400 known consignors, inspected annually by independent validators. This model continues to attract great interest abroad. It is being used by the EU as the basis for their

revision of the EC air cargo security regulations and used as a model by others, notably the US, in the development of their cargo procedures. Work has also continued on the seventeen projects in the air cargo security strategy, to develop further the UK's regime. This has included: gathering best practice material to produce guidance on ensuring cargo security during road haulage; a comprehensive revision of the cargo training regime for industry staff; preparations for the development and trials of new screening technologies; and an improved operating protocol for the Remote Air Sampling for Canine Olfaction (RASCO) technique (an innovative use of sniffer dogs).

A **regulated agent** is an entity (usually a freight agent or cargo handling agent) who is successful in applying for that status. The commercial advantage of regulated agent is that it empowers that entity to change the security status of cargo from insecure cargo to secure cargo - indicated by the abbreviation SPX (secure for all aircraft) or SCO (Secure for cargo-only aircraft). This capacity to secure cargo enables them to pass cargo directly to airlines in a security condition which enables the airline to fly it without securing it themselves - thus they can negotiate a premium rate from the airline.

A **known consignor** is an entity who originates cargo in a condition where from the outset it cannot contain a prohibited article. The known consignor applies to the department for validation of their security by an independent validator, accredited and allocated by the department. There is a fee of £400 payable to the validator for this service. Should they be successful in their annual validation, they will be empowered to originate cargo as secure and to pass it to airlines and regulated agents as secure cargo; again there should be a financial incentive to acquire and keep the status as the regulated agent and the airline should not have to secure the cargo. The terms "known consignor" and "regulated agent" have been in use in one form or another since 1992 and are the EU standard.

For further information, see the Department's website at <http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/security/aviation/aircargo/changestothekaircargosecure4871?page=1>

Contingency response

The menu of potential response options which supports heightened security measures was reviewed during the year, in close consultation with the industry. This was part of TRANSEC'S continuing work to ensure that industry is as well prepared as it can be to respond quickly and effectively to a heightened general or specific threat. A revised and updated menu was issued to the industry in January.

National Aviation Security Committee

The National Aviation Security Committee (NASC), constituted in 1971, is the formal high-level consultative mechanism tasked with co-ordinating activities between those responsible for the National Aviation Security Programme (NASP). A formal consultation on the future role and structure of NASC is currently under way. The consultation is considering any constraints and challenges facing NASC through its current structure, membership and representation. It is anticipated that the review will be concluded by the middle of 2008.

Training

During the year, TRANSEC's dedicated aviation security training team organised and/or participated in 17 training courses: 8 for security managers; 2 for ground instructors; 2 for aircrew instructors; and 5 on firearms and explosives recognition. The team also accredited the training programmes of 20 industry trainers to deliver cargo and catering security training, successfully implemented general security awareness training (GSAT) for all new airside pass applicants who do not have specific security duties, trialled a new competence assessment process for accrediting trainers to deliver managers' refresher training and produced a very well received training DVD for the cargo industry. This was entitled "Airtight-secure Air Cargo" and was awarded a Gold Award for Practical Training by the International Visual Communications Association.

Compliance

The aviation security compliance team has continued with the core programme of prioritised inspections, audits and tests. This has included both continuing work arising from the August 2006 security alert and also the need to direct significant resource towards Heathrow Terminal 5, to deliver a secure transition from building site to operational terminal. The team has also engaged productively with many industry security forums; facilitated EU, ECAC and ICAO inspections in the UK; and provided speakers for industry training courses, to ensure that industry staff are given the best possible understanding of their role. Some inspectors have also undertaken training to carry out a role as UK EU inspectors in other countries. As ever, liaison with key stakeholders has been an integral part of compliance activity and the team continues to engage at all levels within the industry.

International work

The security regime restricting the carriage of liquids by passengers, adopted across the EU in 2006 and subsequently recommended by ICAO to all States, has been maintained and refined in the relevant international fora, to establish a consistent and stable approach for passengers and security providers. Work has continued in parallel in the UK, as part of a major international collaboration, to develop security systems that will enable these restrictions to be removed as soon as possible. Trials of relevant processes are already in hand in the UK and elsewhere, on a co-ordinated basis.

In addition to its multilateral work, TRANSEC has continued to work bilaterally with a wide range of partner States, in particular across Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf, and South Central Asia, to deliver advice and training, and where appropriate to provide equipment, and to engage in wider aviation security capacity-building activities. This large and busy programme of work has included the hosting of visits to the UK by TRANSEC's equivalents from other States, to improve their detailed understanding of how the UK believes aviation security can best be organised and delivered.

This work to enhance aviation security standards and performance overseas, addressing inter alia the potential threat from shoulder-launched missiles, has once again been pursued in parallel with a very full programme of assessments of the security of UK airline operations overseas, leading where appropriate to the reinforcement of local protective security. These assessments are undertaken by TRANSEC staff based both in the UK and abroad, and working sometimes with valuable support from FCO, MOD and the UK security agencies.

MARITIME SECURITY

The focus this year has been the further consolidation of the regime put in place through international agreement. Moreover, the decision to regulate domestic ferry operations in sea areas on vessels carrying more than 250 passengers was carried out, with all aspects of security certification completed.

2005 Protocols to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts

Following the UK signing of the Protocols, subject to ratification, in January 2007, legislation has been prepared in readiness for an opportunity to include the provisions in an appropriate Bill.

Port security

The regulatory regime for port security, as set out by the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) and European regulations, has been extended by a European directive. TRANSEC has recently launched a consultation on regulations which will transpose the direction into UK law. The directive calls for a multi-agency approach to the protection of ports and TRANSEC will be offering guidance to port operators to help them assess security at their ports.

Multi-agency threat and risk assessment (MATRA)

The Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment method has been simplified for application to the port environment, following a trial at four ports in the UK. The method will be rolled out to ports as guidance for undertaking the Port Security Assessments required by the Port Security Directive.

MATRA (Multi Agency Threat and Risk Assessment) is a process by which all relevant stakeholders work together to identify threats and risks together with the appropriate security responses.

Vehicle access to maritime ports (VAMPS)

The incidents at Glasgow Airport in June 2007 focused further attention on the vulnerability of public areas in the transport system. Since then TRANSEC has been examining how it might reduce the vulnerability of terminal areas to attacks by vehicles. A VAMPS feasibility study and survey report has been undertaken and this work will continue in 2008-09.

Training

TRANSEC continued its programme of delivering regular maritime security awareness “roadshows” at port facilities throughout the United Kingdom. These roadshows are delivered in conjunction with the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and are aimed at all those working in the maritime industry.

A new programme of search 'clinics' was also introduced to enhance manual search techniques of persons and vehicles at port facilities in the UK. These clinics were initiated by TRANSEC and have been very well received by the target audience.

Following on from the very successful "Safe Harbours" DVD, promoting port security awareness, TRANSEC has been working on a similar DVD, focussing on ship security. Much of the filming and production work for this DVD has been completed during the year, and it is expected that it will be available for distribution in early 2008-09.

Compliance

TRANSEC continued its regular programme of inspections of UK ports, and vessels operating from them, and of UK flagged cruise ships, both in UK and overseas ports, to ensure the continued protection of the ships and those travelling on them. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) undertakes inspections of cargo ships on TRANSEC's behalf. TRANSEC concluded a Service Level Agreement with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency to formalise the operational level relationship in existence between the two organisations. TRANSEC also continued to develop its maritime covert test regime, focussing upon passenger ports in the UK.

International work

TRANSEC has continued to promote higher maritime security standards overseas, through the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and as a member of G8. This year it has been using funds controlled by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to train overseas government officials and law enforcement personnel in maritime security

CHANNEL TUNNEL SECURITY

Joint government document

TRANSEC has been working closely with Eurotunnel, the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority and its counterparts in France to ensure that the security provisions of the expanded Joint Government Document are implemented in a practical, pragmatic and effective manner.

Review of requirements

A review of the security arrangements in the Channel Tunnel system was completed by TRANSEC and presented to the Intergovernmental Commission in the autumn. TRANSEC continues to take forward recommendations and actions arising from that report, in conjunction with its French counterparts.

High Speed 1

The new St Pancras International and Ebbsfleet stations opened in November 2007, together with a new maintenance depot at Temple Mills, east London. Security was built into the station designs and, where appropriate, improved on what had been in place at

Waterloo International Terminal. Improvements included the installation of permanent vehicle control measures at both new stations.

LAND TRANSPORT SECURITY

Domestic rail and underground security

The security threat to the domestic rail industry has remained high throughout the year. Accordingly, security measures have remained at a high level. This represents a real challenge to the industry, but one to which it has continued to rise.

Vehicle Access to Stations (VATS)

The incidents in London and at Glasgow Airport in June 2007 led to an acceleration of the work already under way to improve the control of vehicular access to stations. This work will continue throughout 2008/09, when it is expected that permanent new vehicle control measures will be in place at certain domestic stations.

TRANSEC has maintained its close working relationship with the British Transport Police (BTP). Following the screening trials carried out in 2006 it has worked with the BTP to agree enhancements to their existing screening capability for passengers and bags, through expanded use of explosives detection dogs and mobile x-ray equipment.

Following detailed consultation with industry, new railway security instructions were issued to Network Rail and the Train Operating Companies in September 2007. Working with industry, TRANSEC has reviewed and revised existing station security measures and developed new requirements for passenger trains. The new instructions are supported by an updated National Railways Security Programme which provides best practice guidance on meeting the requirements.

Training

With cooperation from industry and British Transport Police, new training DVDs covering the security of international railfreight and the secure transportation of dangerous goods by rail were produced. An updated and enhanced training toolkit has been issued to industry to support the induction and training of rail staff with security responsibilities.

Compliance

With industry backing, the proportion of announced security inspections has been increased to support the establishment of revised security instructions, introduced in autumn 2007, and to allow direct engagement with station managers, who have a crucial role in ensuring effective local delivery of TRANSEC requirements. TRANSEC has also increased the amount of covert testing and thematic audits, in order to maintain a properly balanced programme of compliance activity. In the first half of the year, inspectors continued to undertake a programme of security surveys at key station sites to support the vehicle access to train stations (VATS) project.

Compliance activity has also continued in the light rail and underground regulated sectors -

London Underground, the Docklands Light Railway and the Glasgow Subway. In addition to normal programmed inspections, a programme of 'spot checks' at main LU stations has been introduced to increase compliance coverage and to inform future programming priorities.

Buses and coaches

Following the attacks in London in July 2005, TRANSEC produced best-practice security guidance for all bus and coach operators. Although the measures in the guidance are primarily aimed at improving security, many will have additional benefits from crime reduction and increased passenger confidence. Over the last year, TRANSEC visited bus and coach operators across the country to raise awareness of the guidance and seek feedback on it.

Dangerous goods security

Compliance with the regulations governing security of the transport of dangerous goods by road and rail continued to be monitored by VOSA traffic examiners and TRANSEC rail inspectors. Compliance activity included inspections of a range of sites involved in the transportation of dangerous goods as well as roadside inspections.

International work

TRANSEC has continued to be fully involved in developing formal international co-operation in the area of land transport security. During the year, contributions have been made at three meetings of the International Working Group on Land Transport Security and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) working group on Inland Transport Security. These meetings provide opportunities to share learning and experiences in order to improve land transport security worldwide.

SECURITY ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE TRANSPORT SECTOR

Security reviews

In July 2007 the Prime Minister asked Lord West to conduct a review of how crowded places, transport infrastructure and critical national infrastructure could best be protected from terrorist attack. Statements by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary on 14 November outlined the findings of Lord West's review, though the report itself was not published in full, since to do so could prejudice national security.

With regard to transport infrastructure, Lord West's work recognised the scope and nature of TRANSEC's security programmes, and concluded that there was no current requirement for a fundamental change in the way that counter-terrorism security in transport is regulated.

The report also noted the significance of TRANSEC's continuing work with the aviation industry on measures to provide an appropriate level of protective security at entry points to airports and terminals, and of its programme to deliver better measures to protect railway stations from the risk of a vehicle attack.

On 17 December, the Secretary of State for Transport commissioned an independent review into the current arrangements for personnel security in the transport industry. This review is being led by Stephen Boys Smith, who undertook the 2006 Independent Review of Airport Policing, and complements Lord West's examination of infrastructure security. The review will examine all transport modes, including aviation, rail networks, heavy goods vehicles and the maritime industry. Its conclusions are expected this summer.

Government counter-terrorist programme

Transport security continues to feature as a work stream in its own right within the "protective security" element of the Government's counterterrorist programme (CONTEST). This provides a framework to deliver the Government's security programmes and involves close working between key government stakeholders, the police and the security service, as set out in the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, "*Security in an Interdependent World*".

Transport Select Committee inquiry: "Travelling Without Fear"

On 12 December 2007 the Transport Select Committee (TSC) published oral and written evidence relating to its inquiry into transport security, "*Travelling Without Fear*". However, the Committee has taken no further evidence since the 6 December 2006 evidence session with the Secretary of State for Transport and the Director of TRANSEC. In its Annual Report for 2007, the Committee stated that "given the range of security related subjects on which we have reported in the last two years, we have decided not to produce a final, omnibus Report covering transport security as a discrete subject".

Transport security for the Olympics

Work has started in earnest this year on preparations for securing the 2012 London Olympics. TRANSEC will continue to work closely with the BTP, the Olympic Delivery Authority and others on this issue over the next four years.

Working with the industry

TRANSEC keeps the transport industries informed of the Government's requirements for security measures by means of legally enforceable Directions and through twice-yearly meetings of national security committees for each transport mode. These meetings are chaired by the Department and attended by representatives of transport operating companies, trade associations, trade unions, the police and other government departments and agencies. In addition, through the work of sub-committees, working groups and various informal meetings, TRANSEC seeks to consult as widely as possible on all issues affecting the transport industries. The help and co-operation of the industry is sought (and granted) regularly when new measures are being developed and trialled.

Threats, intelligence & contingencies

TRANSEC continues to maintain a close working relationship with the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), the CPNI and other intelligence and wider Government partners. This ensures that TRANSEC continues to be aware of the breadth and depth of the threat,

particularly in relation to transport. Information is used in a variety of ways, from informing policy and compliance activity to shaping training, advice and guidance material, both internally and externally.

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

Research, analysis and development

The key analytical activity undertaken was the analysis of the aviation passenger security regime to determine the factors governing the amount of hand luggage passengers could be allowed to carry. This analysis was able to ascertain the relationship between the numbers of bags allowed, the capacity of the security regime, the screening technology being used and the queuing time for passengers. Applying an algorithm based on this relationship to applications from airports for relaxation of the one bag restriction allowed the feasibility of their applications to be confirmed or rejected.

Working with other UK Government and international partners, TRANSEC was able to identify appropriate technologies for the screening of liquids in aviation security. These have been successfully trialled in UK airports and brought into service.

Work conducted for TRANSEC by the MoD Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) has developed new methods for training dogs to detect explosives.

National security vetting

TRANSEC has oversight of the vetting of transport personnel. Airport security personnel have been vetted since 1997. Staff at the Channel Tunnel have been vetted since the site opened, with Eurostar security staff being added later. Maritime Port Facility Security Officers have been vetted since 2003. The volume of vetting is largely driven by the staffing needs of the industry, although the posts for which vetting clearance is required is determined by TRANSEC. Industry clearances are valid for only three years, so there is a regular turnover of renewal applications as well as first-time applications.

TRANSEC received 12,736 applications (up 5%) and determined 12,497 applications (up 25%) in 2007-08. The number of applications received continues to increase, probably due to the aviation industry recruiting additional staff to manage better security processes and to resource additional capacity e.g. Heathrow Terminal 5.

Contingency planning

The main response to disruptive events in the UK continues to rest at the local level and with transport operators. However, if the scale of the crisis demands it, national and even international arrangements may be called on. TRANSEC is responsible for co-ordinating the Department's crisis response preparations and activities, working with Agencies, other Government departments and key industry players, as necessary.

2007 proved to be one of the most active in terms of implementing the Department's crisis response mechanism, on account of both terrorist and non-terrorist events. These included the London and Glasgow bombs, the major flooding in Gloucestershire and other

counties, the foot and mouth outbreak and the tidal surge down the east coast. There was also engagement in a range of major cross-Whitehall exercises, including on pandemic flu and total loss of electricity across the UK. The DfT crisis mechanism worked well and provided the Department and Ministers with the appropriate levels of support and response.

This positive outcome is due to the programme of work undertaken in 2007 to continue to develop and improve the DfT Concept of Operations (“CONOPS” - DfT’s agreed operational procedures for responding to emergencies) and its capability to respond. This included the completion of awareness training across policy teams and the identification of appropriate staff to carry out key roles in the incident room. It also involved improved engagement in Whitehall exercises, and the sharing of key risk information from the National Risk Assessment, both within DfT and with transport stakeholders, to enable more effective preparation for potential crises. The DfT crisis response mechanism is continually under review, to ensure it remains fit for purpose.

Secure communications

The secure communications project will deliver secure, faster, more efficient and effective two-way electronic communications with stakeholders. Detailed work has continued during the year on system design and hosting arrangements. A key priority has been to ensure that the required level of security will be met when the system is operational. The system is due to go live in 2008.

MANAGEMENT OF THE DIRECTORATE

Business planning and resources

TRANSEC conforms to the Department’s planning process and prepares an annual business plan. This business plan, which is subject to internal scrutiny, supports the Directorate’s request for resources. TRANSEC’s headcount target was set at 205 full-time equivalents as at 31 March 2008, and this limit was not exceeded.

In common with other DfT Directorates, TRANSEC reported regularly to the DfT Board during the year on progress towards achieving the objectives, key milestones and key performance indicators set out in the business plan.

Flexible deployment

This was TRANSEC’s first full year using the DfT’s flexible deployment (FD) system. The FD system is a database which captures information about planned and actual use of staff time, in order to aid resource planning. This year a stronger link was made between the business plan and the FD system.

TRANSEC Information Management System (TIMS)

The TRANSEC Information Management System (TIMS) continues to be a key component in the targeting and management of TRANSEC’s compliance activities within the transport industries. Towards the end of the year a change programme was

started to identify system improvements, and this will be taken forward in the coming year. The aim of the programme is to facilitate the collection of additional data and further to enhance management information.

TRANSEC expenditure 2007-08

In view of TRANSEC's role, HM Treasury has agreed that all its funding from 2007-08 should be treated as programme expenditure rather than administration expenditure. This means that the financial analysis shown in this report differs from that shown in previous years.


The budget allocation for 2007-08 covered expenditure on all staff costs (pay and non-pay), non-cash costs (depreciation and cost of capital) and programmes (resource and capital). Total spend for the year was £19,923k, split as follows:

Staff costs	£11,019k
Non-cash	£ 171k
Programmes (resource)	£ 8,558k
Programmes (capital)	£ 175k


(The costs of Regional Aviation Security Liaison Officers (RASLOs) are included in the *Programmes (resource)* figure.)

The following graphs give an analysis of TRANSEC's expenditure:


Total expenditure 2007-08



Staff costs expenditure 2007-08





Programmes expenditure 2007-08






ANNEX A

Allocation of Staff Resources as at 31/3/08

TRANSEC STAFF BY FUNCTION BY MODE





ANNEX B

Main abbreviations used in this report

ASP	Airport Security Plan
AMSA	Aviation & Maritime Security Act (1990)
BTP	British Transport Police
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CONTEST	Counter-Terrorism Strategy
CPNI	Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
DSTL	Defence Science & Technology Laboratory
ECAC	European Civil Aviation Conference
FD	Flexible deployment
GSAT	General Security Awareness Training
ICAO	International civil Aviation Organisation
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
ISPS	International Ship & Port Facility Security Code
JTAC	Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
MATRA	Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment
MCA	Maritime & Coastguard Agency
NASC	National Aviation Security Committee
NASP	National Aviation Security Programme
ODA	Olympic Delivery Authority
RASCO	Remote Air Sampling for Canine Olfaction
RASLOs	Regional Aviation Security Liaison Officers
TIMS	TRANSEC Information Management System
TOCs	Train operating companies
TRANSEC	Department for Transport Directorate of Security & Civil Contingencies
TSC	Transport Select Committee
UNECE	United National Economic Commission for Europe
VAMPS	Vehicle access to maritime ports
VATS	Vehicle access to train stations
VOSA	Vehicle and Operator Services Agency